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Coastal State Fishery Regulation Under
International Law: A Comment on the
La Bretagne Award of July 17, 1986




During the early negotiations leading to the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea," in the period 1974-76 when most of the basic
negotiations were completed on the non-seabed portions of the ulti-
mate treaty, it was widely believed that fisheries issues engaged the
most intense political interest on the part of States, both developed
and developing.2 Non-resource issues, the foremost being navigation
rights, were no doubt of greater significance to some states but were
not as widely appreciated as those concerning resources.' In contrast
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law;
I. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS
Convention]; XVII Official Records, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea 151, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 7 Oct. 1982.
2. The first draft text of the treaty was issued in the spring of 1975 as the Infor-
mal Single Negotiating Text and its general provisions on fisheries were virtually final.
Other than for drafting purposes, very few changes occurred over the next seven years,
and these primarily reflected the negotiations over landlocked and geographically disad-
vantaged states.
3. This is probably explained by the circumstance that military considerations
were widely perceived as most important for navigation rights, although more general
factors were not wholly neglected. From a global perspective certainly, navigation rights
essential to the movement of cargo are far more critical to states in general than are
fisheries. The primary tradeoffs in the negotiations involved resource and navigation in-
terests. If the former were satisfied, this would assure a satisfactory regime for
to deep seabed mining, which generated most of the public attention,
fisheries negotiations were taken seriously because they concerned
immediately available resources and would affect extremely large
current investments. On a global basis, beginning in the latter half of
the 1950's, enormous commitments of capital and labor had been
made to fisheries harvesting and processing which were occurring
within areas that would probably come under coastal state jurisdic-
tion.4 The outcome of the negotiations would have major impact on
these investments and on the patterns of social, economic, and politi-
cal life they represented.
For these reasons, considerable pressure understandably attended
these negotiations. The proposals being considered most seriously
were virtually 180-degree reversals of a regime that had prevailed
for hundreds of years and had provided the foundation for national
fishing strategies for greatly increased fishing effort of the past sev-
eral decades. Alternatives under discussion threatened significant
losses - in employment, sources of foreign exchange, protein sup-
plies and even national territory - which in turn could result in
navigation.
4. Data on development of national fishing fleets is scarce and the best way to
document investment in fishing is by the evidence of increased catches. Over the period
1950-70, total world landings of fish (excluding whales and seaweed) increased from 21.2
to 66.3 million metric tons, indicating a tripling of effort.
In an exhaustive study of fisheries and management, John Gulland notes
[T]he feature of the world's fisheries in the 1960s and 1970s which distin-
guishes them from earlier periods - and almost certainly from future periods
- has been the importance of long-range fishing. The invention of freezing at
sea, and particularly of the large factory trawler pioneered by the British Fair-
try, has enabled countries with few resources around their coasts to become
major fishing countries, as well as allowing those with good, but still limited,
local resources to expand their catches beyond those limits. The most noticea-
ble examples have been the countries of eastern Europe; Russian catches in-
creased nearly six-fold between 1950 and 1975, reaching over 10 million tons
in 1976, and the expansion of Polish catches (to over 800,000 tons in 1975) has
been almost as striking. Another important long-range fishing country has been
Japan - particularly for tuna - but others, including some developing coun-
tries (e.g. Republic of Korea, Ghana, and Cuba), have their own long-range
fleets.
GULLAND, WORLD RESOURCES OF FISHERIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT, V MARINE
ECOLOGY, Part 2, 839, 844 (Otto Kinne, ed. 1983).
Kravanja estimates Soviet investment in fishing and support fleets during the 1946-75
period to be about US $11.2 billion. Kravanja, The Soviet Fishing Industry: A Review,
in Soviet Oceans Development, a National Ocean Policy Study, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
377, 424-25 (1976). The overall magnitude of investment by other nations might have
equalled and perhaps exceeded that of the Soviets. For general discussion of the increase
in fishing effort for two decades after World War II see FAO, The Management of
Fishery Resources 3-6 (1967).
For a more general assessment of the importance of fisheries to individual nations as a
source of food, balance of payments, employment, and other economic effects see FAO
Dept. of Fisheries, The Economic and Social Effects of the Fishing Industry - a Com-
parative Study, FAO FISH. CIRC. No. 314 (1973) (Document prepared by FAO for the
United Nations Seabed Committee.)
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damaging social, economic and political costs, especially for nations
with weak agricultural systems or for those who elevated concepts of
maritime sovereignty into emotion-laden issues of national pride and
respect.5 Distant water fishing states (both developed and developing,
but mainly the former) would be the principal losers, while numer-
ous coastal (especially island) states might reap potentially large
benefits.'
Reaching compromises to resolve the fishery jurisdiction issues
was, therefore, likely to encounter difficulties. In order to overcome
serious differences of view, here, as on other controversial matters,
successful negotiations were virtually certain to require formulas
that were general and somewhat abstract but still technically capa-
ble of providing useful guidance for decisions. There is certainly no
lack of concepts in articles 61-73 of the 1982 Convention' that fit
this description, including allowable catch, maximum sustainable
yield as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors,
optimum utilization, and harvesting capacity.'
It is now almost six years since the adoption of the LOS Conven-
tion and over ten years since the general acceptance of unilaterally
extended fisheries jurisdiction, but we are still only in the early
phases of working out the implications of these events for wealth and
other value distributions. Establishing national fisheries regimes is a
difficult and time-consuming task, even for the leading developed na-
tions. The conflicts and controversies over the benefits and the bur-
dens of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provisions on fisheries are
still underway; in the course of the manuevering, participants still
disagree about the appropriate interpretation of key terms in the
5. Different participants faced differing losses. Probable losers of varying seri-
ousness included the USSR, Japan, South Korea, Poland, Spain, Ecuador, and Peru.
While the United States as a whole was not likely to lose, individual industries were
vulnerable, especially shrimp and tuna. As it turned out, both have lost free access to
their normal fishing areas off foreign coasts.
6. These prospects were later realized in varying degree when states generally
moved to 200 mile zones while the law of the sea negotiations were still in the earlier
stages. See Cleveland, National Adjustments to Changes in Fisheries Law and Economic
Conditions, FAO FISH. CIRc. No. 783, 25 (1985). See also Troadec, Introduction to
Fisheries Management 1-2 FAO FISH. TECH. PAPER No. 224, 12 (1983) and literature
cited therein.
7. These are the major provisions on fisheries in the exclusive economic zone.
Other articles concern archipelagic waters and high seas. LOS Convention, supra note 1.
8. Allowable catch, LOS Convention article 61(1); maximum sustainable yield
as qualified, article 61(3); optimum utilization, article 62(1); capacity to harvest, article
61(2).
treaty in relation to fisheries. 9 Although the treaty is not in force, 10
states and other advocates invoke its provisions, along with state
practice, to argue that customary international law supports or re-
jects particular claims, often the same claim as in the controversy
discussed here. 1
9. It seems probable that a good deal more evidence exists for this proposition
than is generally known in light of the considerable difficulties now experienced in discov-
ering the views of states on these and other law of the sea issues. The following instances
can be documented:
(1) Japan and Korea are reported to have urged that the reference to "economic dislo-
cation" in article 62(3) required that United States bilateral fisheries agreements refer-
ring to conditions of access to its exclusive fisheries zone be changed. Remarks of Hon.
Don Young, April 21, 1982, CONG. REC. E1668, (1982);
(2) In a diplomatic message to Spain, the United States stated its disagreement with
the Spanish interpretation of articles 61, 62, 69 and 70 (unpublished cable July, 1985);
(3) In domestic legislation within the United States seeking to enjoin enforcement of
United States law imposing heavy fines for taking fish in violation of foreign law, plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully argued that Mexico's prohibition of foreign shrimp fishing in the
Mexican EEZ was a violation of the requirement of optimum utilization in article 62.
Brownsville-Port Isabel Shrimp Producers Association v. Anthony J. Calio et. al., Doc.
No. B-85-99 (S.D. Tex., June 19, 1985);
(4) Referring to LOS Convention, articles 61-62 and the attitude of certain undis-
closed states, probably European and West African, fishery experts recently wrote:
Though on the surface reasonably straightforward, these run into problems
when matched against the complexities of the dynamics of fish populations, or
of the national interests and relationships involved in giving access. It is becom-
ing clear that there are therefore considerable uncertainties, especially in devel-
oping countries, about what is really involved, and these in turn have caused
uncertainties in national policies, not only in the granting of access, but in mat-
ters that might be related to access. For example it appears that some coastal
states are reluctant to enter into joint programs of fishery research and assess-
ment of fish stocks with long-distance fishing countries on the grounds that
such research would give to foreigners excessive knowledge of resources availa-
ble and would commit coastal countries to given access to those resources at
some later time.
Garcia, Gulland, and Miles, The New Law of the Sea, and the Access to Surplus Fish
Resources, 10 MARINE POLICY 192-93 (1986).
(5) The United States and numerous coastal and island states in the eastern, central
and western Pacific are in profound disagreement over the interpretation of articles 56
and 64 concerning coastal state authority over tuna as one of the living resources of ihe
EEZ. The recent fishing agreement between the United States and the Pacific Isl nd
States of April, 1987, is interpreted by some as indicating that the United States ]no
longer contests coastal state authority. But others do not believe the United States has
changed its position.
10. As of Aug. 1987, 159 nations have signed the Convention. Thirty-five nati ns
have deposited instruments of ratification with the U.N. The Convention enters into fo -ce
one year after 60 ratifications are deposited. Ocean Pol'y News., pt. 1, Aug. 1987.
11. Of course, much more than fisheries is involved. The United States alone has
made numerous protests to other nations, citing the 1982 Convention as reflecting cbs-
tomary international law on a variety of contemporary issues. Issues involved include
transit passage of aircraft and vessels, archipelagic waters, archipelagic sea lanes pias-
sage, closing lines for bays, criteria for straight baselines, authorization or notification of
passage through the territorial sea, priority for allocations of surplus fishery resources in
the EEZ, the scope of coastal state discretion to determine the allowable catch, harv st-
ing capacity and surplus allocation, the extent of coastal state criminal jurisdiction in the
EEZ, and the provisions of article 76 on the continental shelf. Some of these are (is-
cussed in Burke, Law of the Sea: Customary Norms and Conventional Rules, in 1987
498
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State practice is helpful in providing details about management
options and specific regulatory alternatives. Trends in practice help
establish the bounds of permissible regulatory competence. States
also look for guidance to third party decisions dealing with the fish-
eries provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention. In the context of myr-
iad contentions about who gets what from fisheries under varying
conditions, the judgment of a third party on the relevance and mean-
ing of treaty standards may be valuable beyond the immediate con-
text of the decision. It may sort what is acceptable from what is not
and assist in bringing order to complicated transactions.
The point of this commentary is that these third party perspectives
have merit in particular instances, but those concerned cannot auto-
matically assume that such decisions invariably provide helpful guid-
ance. While reasoned decisions may sometimes deserve special
weight in the process of establishing agreed guidelines for the per-
missible exercise of fishery authority under either the 1982 Conven-
tion or customary law, careful assessment is required to determine
their value for this purpose.
Because of these considerations, nations as well as observers of the
international legal process have reason to be particularly interested
in the July 1986 decision of the arbitral tribunal established by Can-
ada and France to resolve a dispute arising out of their 1972 agree-
ment on mutual fishing relations. The Award in this arbitration is
the subject of this commentary.12
In a recent article, Prof. Michael Reisman proposed the study of
international incidents as a decision unit in international law that
could provide valuable guidelines for assessing the expectations of
decision-makers on significant issues.13 Commenting upon this propo-
sal, Prof. Bowett observed that the Canada-France Arbitral Award
does not fit under the incident genre and must be studied by "nor-
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (in press) and Burke, Cus-
tomary Law as reflected in the Convention: A Slippery Formula, paper presented at the
21st annual meeting of the Law of the Sea Institute, August, 1987 (in press).
12. The Award is available in French in 90 REV. GEN. INT'L PuB. 716 (1986). As
yet, apparently, there is no published English language version of the decision. The au-
thor obtained a version from the Canadian Office of External Affairs, in addition to the
Canadian Memorial, Countermemorial, annexes thereto, and the text of Canada's oral
pleadings. The French pleadings remain confidential, as permitted by the Arbitral Agree-
ment. The Award of July 17, 1986 contains the text of the 1972 Agreement, the 1985
Arbitration Agreement and the Award itself.
13. See Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in Inter-
national Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984); see also Willard, Incidents: An Essay in
Method, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 21 (1984); Falk, The Validity of the Incidents Genre, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 376 (1987).
mal, traditional analysis."14 Perhaps this is true, but it does not de-
tract from Prof. Reisman's assertion that the decisions of such tribu-
nals are given undue deference as authoritative expressions of
international law.
An objective of the instant commentary is to assist in avoiding the
possibility of "undue deference" to the Award in question. The deci-
sion by the Tribunal in the La Bretagne case has little substance that
makes it worthy of consideration or adoption. The majority opinion
does not merit emulation either for the process of legal analysis, for
its approach to treaty interpretation, for its use of prior decisions, or
for its views about substantive international law for fisheries.
Background of dispute
During the period 1964-70, Canada took several actions to enlarge
the reach of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction. One such action was
including the Gulf of St. Lawrence within Canadian fisheries closing
lines in 1970. Subsequently, Canada sought to reach agreement with
other states whose fishing activities were affected. After the first
modest extensions of fisheries limits in 1964, negotiations with
France were inconclusive. Following the establishment of fishing
closing lines in the Gulf in 1970, Canada renewed negotiations.
These negotiations sought to phase out metropolitan France fisheries
in Canadian waters while allowing local fisheries to continue from
Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, small French islands off the coast of
southern Newfoundland. These negotiations led to the 1972 Agree-
ment on these and other matters.15
Article 3 of the 1972 Agreement provides for phasing out the fish-
ery conducted from metropolitan France:
Fishing vessels registered in metropolitan France may continue to fish from
January 15 to May 15 each year, up to May, 1986, on an equal footing
with Canadian vessels, in the Canadian fishing zone within the Gulf of St.
Lawrence.1 6
The fishery from the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon enjoyed
different treatment because of, their close proximity to the Canadian
coast and to the Gulf, the modest size of the fishery, and local eco-
nomic dependency on the fishery. Article 4 embodies the relevant
provisions:
In view of the special situation of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon and as an
arrangement between neighbors:
(a) French coastal fishing boats registered in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon
may continue to fish in the areas where they have traditionally fished along
the coasts of Newfoundland ..
14. Bowett, International Incidents: New Genre or New Delusion?, 12 YALE J.
INT'L L. 386, 387 (1987).
15. The text of the Agreement is included in the AWARD, supra note 12 at 5-7.
16. AWARD, supra note 12 at 6.
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(b) A maximum of ten French trawlers registered in Saint-Pierre and Mi-
quelon, of a maximum length of 50 meters, may continue to fish along the
coasts of Newfoundland, of Nova Scotia (with the exception of the Bay of
Fundy), and in the Canadian fishing zone within the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
on an equal footing with Canadian trawlers: Canadian trawlers registered
in the ports on the Atlantic coast of Canada may continue to fish along the
coasts of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon on an equal footing with French
trawlers."7
Article 6 of the Agreement spells out the obligations of Canada in
the exercise of its authority to regulate all the French fisheries:
I. Canadian fishery regulations shall be applied without discrimination in
fact or in law to the French fishing vessels covered by Articles 3 and 4,
including regulations concerning the dimensions of vessels authorized to fish
less then 12 miles from the Atlantic coast of Canada.
2. French fishery regulations shall be applied under the same conditions to
the Canadian fishing vessels covered by Article 4.
3. Before promulgating new regulations applicable to these vessels, the au-
thorities of each of the parties shall give three months prior notice to the
authorities of the other party.18
The specific facts and claims giving rise to the dispute are as fol-
lows. In January, 1985 a company in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon
sought a license from Canada for the vessel La Bretagne, registered
in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, to fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. La
Bretagne, a so-called freezer-trawler, was equipped to fillet the catch
and store it aboard the vessel. Such vessels have much greater fish-
ing capacity than the wetfish trawlers which had previously fished in
the Gulf. Freezer-trawlers would normally take more fish because
they are able to fish longer and to store more aboard. In refusing the
requested license to operate as a freezer-trawler, Canada still al-
lowed the vessel to fish but limited processing of the fish to heading
and gutting rather than filleting. The Canadian refusal was based on
its authority to regulate and on the article 4(b) principle of equal
footing, since Canada's trawlers in the Gulf were also prohibited
from filleting their catch. France responded that this prohibition vio-
lated obligations in the 1972 agreement.' 9
Under the 1972 Agreement the parties had agreed in article 10 to
resolve their dispute through a compulsory dispute settlement proce-
dure. Pursuant to that procedure, the parties constituted a Tribunal.
Each party designated an expert and their two governments selected
a third to serve as chairman.20 The precise question before the Tri-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. This account is from the Tribunal's statement of the origin of the dispute. Id.
at paras. 14-16.
20. Id. at 7.
bunal was whether the French trawlers referred to in article 4(b)
may or may not be forbidden to engage in fish filleting in the Gulf of
St. Lawrence.
In a two-to-one decision the majority of the Tribunal decided that
Canada may not forbid filleting in the Gulf of St. Lawrence by these
vessels. The majority consisted of the French member, Jean-Pierre
Quneudec, and the third expert, Paul de Visseher. The Canadian
member, Prof. Donat Pharand, dissented in a separate opinion.2 1
First, the majority decided that Canada's authority to regulate
French fishing derived solely from article 6 of the 1972 Agreement."2
Second, the Tribunal interpreted "fishery regulations" in article 6 to
mean only fish-catching regulations. Therefore, Canada could not
prescribe regulations that dealt with other operations by French ves-
sels, such as the filleting phase of processing.2 3
These decisions by the majority of the Tribunal appear to be
straightforward, even mundane. However the opinion and underlying
rationale are flawed, deliver general pronouncements which raise se-
rious questions, and reach conclusions unsupported by international
law. The majority did not explain why, if the Agreement did not
deal with the totality of Canada's fishery regulations, Canada would
be unable to adopt and implement or apply other laws for those
areas not covered. The only apparent ground for refusing to recog-
nize such competence is that the 1972 Agreement was intended to
comprise all of the authority Canada could exercise as an indepen-
dent state. In the course of its opinion, the majority discusses inter-
national fisheries law both as customary law and as conventional law
involving both bilateral and multilateral agreements.24 Unfortunately
this discussion reveals a considerable lack of understanding of fishery
conservation, fishery management, and the international law pertain-
ing to such matters.25 Perhaps this is because the technical language
and terminology in these fields are alien to most lawyers and there-
fore communication and understanding of relevant legal concepts are
also unusually difficult.
Whatever the reasons for their decision, if the narrow and rigid
perceptions of fishery management and law in this opinion were typi-
21. Id. at 45.
22. See text at note 32 and following.
23. See text at note 71 and following.
24. AWARD, supra note 12 at paras. 49-54.
25. Some examples of this lack of understanding are omission of the most critical
qualifying words in article 61 of CLOS regarding the conservation measures of coastal
states, perhaps because their significance was not recognized (infra note 90 and accom-
panying text); an extremely restrictive view, not generally followed, of the scope and
purposes of fishery management (infra note 64 and accompanying text); a belief that
international fishery agreements are predominantly concerned with protection of fishery
stocks, as opposed to concerns for the economic welfare of fishermen and the fishing
industry (infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text).
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cal of decision-makers generally, there is cause for apprehension
about the success of instituting modern fishery conservation and
management measures around the globe when foreign fishing activi-
ties are affected. If these perceptions are more widely adopted, im-
portant interests of coastal states could be seriously harmed or de-
stroyed entirely. These perceptions may lead to confusion or
misunderstanding about the economic, social and political goals and
methods of fishery management and about a coastal state's authority
to adopt appropriate regulations.26
In this specific case, the dissenting opinion by Prof. Pharand is
important for more than its cogent analysis of the positions of the
two parties in contemporary international law. It also offers an in-
stant antidote to the numerous errors of the majority by communi-
cating a clear understanding of and orientation to the broad aims
and measures of modern fishery management. In addition, it clarifies
the applicable law.
The following discussion highlights Prof. Pharand's opinion by
noting the more general implications of statements about fundamen-
tal principles that are significant beyond this immediate controversy.
This dispute arose between a coastal fishing state and a distant water
fishing state. It is impossible to overlook the fact that the members
of the majority in this case are nationals of France and Belgium,
both member states of the European Economic Community (EEC),
now the fourth largest fishing "State" in the world.27 Under its char-
26. This is part of a larger problem that has not escaped notice:
Historically fishery management has been concerned [sic] as a biological prob-
lem, dealing with the conservation of fish stocks and improving the physical
yields harvested from them. It has often been felt that it is sufficient to ensure
that the stocks are maintained in condition in which high catches can be taken,
without much concern of what benefits are gained from the catches. This atti-
tude is now changing, and it's now recognized that fisheries is [sic] an eco-
nomic activity involving a broad spectrum of individuals and interests. Catch-
ing or not catching fish affects not only fishermen, but processors and
consumers as well. The success of management, in terms of the full and ra-
tional utilization of the resource depends on many decisions, taken by investors,
tax authorities and others in addition to those setting management controls
(e.g., catch quotas).
The problem of identifying the correct boundaries of the management prob-
lem, and of ensuring that no important interest and influence is omitted, is
discussed further in section 4.2. What should be stressed here is that although
the wider view of management is becoming accepted, the narrow, biological
view is still common. This makes taking the larger view difficult and a matter
that will often require special attention.
FAO, Report of the ACMRR Working Party on the Scientific Basis of Determining
Management Measures, FAO FISH. REP. No. 236 (1980).
27. In 1985 the combined catch of EEC members, including Portugal and Spain,
ter, the EEC supplants the authority of its member states for pur-
poses of fishery management. The EEC, rather than the member
states, conducts any necessary international negotiations concerning
fisheries in non-EEC waters (with only minor exceptions).2 8 Member
states routinely take nearly all the fish available in EEC waters (the
combined fisheries zones of its members). Thus, they are concerned
about gaining access to the fisheries zones of non-EEC members,
most of whom are distant from the EEC states.29
Against this background, coastal states and other distant water
states have a close interest in the Tribunal's treatment of a number
of critical issues. The following discussion focuses on the Tribunal's
statements and views on the following matters: (1) the source of
coastal state authority over fisheries outside national territory but
within extended jurisdiction; (2) the scope of coastal state regulatory
authority in exercise of its sovereign rights; (3) the scope and general
content of coastal regulatory authority under the 1982 LOS treaty;
(4) the supposed difference between authority to regulate fishing by
nationals as opposed to foreign fishing within national jurisdiction;
(5) the application of the standard of reasonableness in exercise of
coastal state regulations; and (6) the implications of a compulsory
dispute settlement provisions in a bilateral fishery agreement.30
It is not clear what harmful effects the actual decision will have on
Canada's regulatory authority. Perhaps the only impact will be lim-
ited, affecting no more than regulatory and enforcement costs and
administrative burdens. However, it is conceivable that much
broader consequences could ensue, such as insulating French factory
trawlers from Canadian quota control or influencing Canada to in-
was exceeded only by the USSR, Japan and China. 1984 FAQ Yearbook of Fishery
Statistics, vol. 60, Table A-5 (1987).
28. For an illuminating discussion of EEC treaty-making power regarding fisher-
ies, see R. CHURCHILL, EEC FISHERIES LAW, chap. 5 (1987). See also generally LEIGH,
EUROI'EAN INTEGRATION AND THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 123-24 (1983); Simmon-
nent, Competence of the European Economic Community in the Field of Fisheries, in
Report of the Expert Consultation on the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of
the Exclusive Economic Zones, FISH REP. No. 293, 183 (1983); Koers, What Trends and
Implications: The Northwest Atlantic, in the MANAGEMENT OF WORLD FISHERIES: IM-
PLICATIONS OF EXTENDED COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION (Edward L. Miles, ed., in
press).
29. For an assessment of the EEC catch possibilities, which also include joint
stocks and stocks outside exclusive fisheries limits, see Holden, The Procedures Followed
and the Problems Met by the European Economic Community, in Implementing the
Scientific Recommendations of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
on Total Allowable Catches, in Papers presented at the Expert Consultation on the Reg-
ulation of Fishing Effort (Fishing Mortality), FAQ FISH. REP. No. 289, Supp. 3, 231
(1985).
30. It is not the intent here to attempt a systematic review of the Tribunal's use
of the principles of treaty interpretation although the majority opinion is a veritable mine
of examples of how not to proceed with that task, some of which are mentioned in the
text.
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crease French quotas substantially, to the disadvantage of local fish-
ermen. Even if the negative impact is modest, an unjustified decision
still imposes the limited harm of inconvenience and increased costs
for the losing side. The actual impact of the decision will be deter-
mined by the subsequent actions of the parties as the relations be-
tween them evolve in light of this decision. Canada's relative position
in that evolution already may be disadvantaged by this decision.31
As this decision and the statements in the opinions become more
widely known, there is potential for broader undesirable impacts
through unnecessary controversies and misleading and erroneous
guidance to decision-makers in unavoidable disputes. The objective
of this comment is to assist in avoiding that possibility. The particu-
lar decision discussed here has little to recommend it. The award
does not merit emulation either for the process of legal analysis, for
its approach to treaty interpretation or for its views about substan-
tive law. Nonetheless, its potential for use as supporting authority,
for reasons mentioned herein, makes critical appraisal of this award
even more desirable.
The Source of Coastal State Authority Over Fisheries
The key issue in dispute, the prohibition of filleting, centers about
articles 4(b) and 6 in the 1972 Agreement for which the parties re-
quested two "radically different interpretations. 32 Canada urged an
interpretation of the Agreement that recognized the "right for trawl-
ers registered in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon to fish in the Canadian
fishing zone within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, on an equal footing
with Canadian vessels in compliance, without discrimination in fact
or in law, with Canadian fishery regulations which prohibit filleting
in the Gulf." 3 Canada also contended that under the general princi-
ples of the law of the sea it has "an inherent right to manage the
biological resources of its exclusive fishing zone, subject to the sole
exceptions mentioned in the text of the Agreement of March 27,
1972."1" In the Canadian view, article 6 authorized Canada to apply
the entire corpus of its law relating to fishery matters, including
31. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text regarding the possibility that
the decision can be and may be used by France to continue to challenge Canada's exclu-
sive rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This appears to be the thrust of the French
protest message of January 1987 rejecting Canada's exclusive right to establish a quota
and challenging the size of the quotas established.
32. AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 24.
33. Id.
34. Id.
processing, subject only to the principle of nondiscrimination. 5
Clearly, under Canada's view, the French right to fish came from
the 1972 Agreement, but Canada's power to regulate did not. That
power is plenary and comprehensive regarding fishery matters. Ac-
cording to Canada, the Agreement was primarily relevant for deter-
mining what limitations it imposed on Canada's otherwise plenary
and comprehensive power to manage its fisheries. 6
France, in direct opposition, believed that both the right to fish
and the total scope of Canada's power to regulate are found in the
agreement between them. France argued that article 4(b)'s "sole ob-
ject is the right to fish ' 37 and since filleting the fish is not "to fish,"
Canada
may not use the regulatory power which derives from Article 6 of the
Agreement of March 27, 1972 for purposes other than the protection of the
fishery resources of its exclusive fishing zone, a finality which the Parties to
the Agreement have fully taken into consideration by imposing specific lim-
its as to the number and dimensions of French trawlers registered in Saint-
Pierre and Miquelon.38
This position necessarily assumes that Canada has no regulatory au-
thority over its fisheries except as provided by the Agreement.
In a ruling that pays only modest deference to the injunction in
article 10 of the Arbitration Agreement of Oct. 23, 1985 that the
"award shall be fully reasoned," the Tribunal concludes, virtually
without explanation, that Canada's authority to regulate its fisheries
stems solely from article 6 of the bilateral agreement39 and, as dis-
cussed further below, that regulatory authority is confined to regula-
tion of harvesting. This finding derives primarily, if not solely, from
the Tribunal's idiosyncratic view of the type of agreement reached
by the Parties. The Tribunal placed enormous weight on the simple
fact that this was a bilateral agreement rather than multilateral. 0
From this the Tribunal concluded that "each Party seeks its own
interests and the common purpose of the two parties is summed up
in the reconciliation of these interests in the form of a
compromise. "41
The resulting agreement is "an arrangement based on a delicate,
fragile balance between the rights and duties of each of the Par-
ties."42 It follows from this that "[iun a treaty of this type, there
appears to be no warrant for treating the rights of one of the parties
35. Id. at para. 35.
36. Id. at para. 24.
37. Id. at para. 24.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. This crucial holding follows the French argument in the case. Id. at paras.
36-37.
40. Id. at para. 30.
41. id.
42. Id.
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as a statement of principle and the rights of the other as a statement
of an exception which, as such, would justify a restrictive interpreta-
tion."' 43 This phrase appears intended to dispose of the basic princi-
ple of international law that a coastal state, such as Canada in this
instance, possesses the right to manage its living resources within an
exclusive fishing zone established in accordance with international
law.4
This refusal of the Tribunal's majority to treat Canada's sovereign
rights as a basic principle sharply contrasts both with current under-
standing about coastal state rights in exclusive economic (or fishing)
zones and with the expectations of Canada and France as revealed in
the minutes of the negotiations in 1964 and 1971 .4 1 There can be no
serious doubt that in an exclusive fishing zone the basic principle is
that the coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, con-
serve, and manage its fisheries. The Tribunal, elsewhere in its opin-
ion, expressly recognized these rights as well as the sole responsibil-
ity of Canada for fishery management. 6 Nonetheless the Tribunal
declares without explanation that in a treaty of this type it was not
required to be guided in resolving the issue in dispute, by reference
to the basic principle involved.
The central passage of the Tribunal's opinion on the specific
source for Canada's regulatory authority in this instance then follows
immediately:
In accordance with the principles embodied in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the law of treaties, (dealing with the general rule of interpre-
tation), the Tribunal proposes to reply to the question put to it in the light
of the balance jointly sought by the Parties between the right to fish
granted to the French trawlers covered by Article 4(b) of the Agreement
and the right to regulate fisheries in the Gulf of St. Lawrence possessed by
Canada by virture of Article 6 of the same agreement.47
43. Id. But the Tribunal does not hesitate to adopt a restrictive interpretation of
Canada's rights under the treaty. The right to fish asserted by France is given an expan-
sive interpretation, indeed it is considered to provide a preference as against Canadian
vessels, while Canada's sovereign right to regulate is given a very narrow and limited
scope. This is discussed in the next section.
44. In fact the waters involved in the Gulf of St. Lawrence were regarded by the
parties in the negotiations leading to the 1972 agreement as internal waters, not just as
an exclusive fishing zone. In either case there is no doubt that the coastal state possesses
sovereign rights to regulate fisheries and to decide upon the conditions of their exploita-
tion. The majority decision in this case treated the Canadian waters in question as part
of a fishing zone and not as internal waters.
45. Annexes 41-43 of the memorial submitted by Canada, Feb. 22, 1985.
46. AWARD, supra note 12, at paras. 49, 63.
47. AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 31. (Emphasis added). This phraseology does
not appear to be simply a loose means of recognizing that Canada has regulatory author-
ity within its fishing zone. In paragraph 24, noted earlier, the Tribunal summarized the
The sentences just quoted appear to be the only justification or
explanation offered for the Tribunal's conclusion. The Tribunal does
not attempt to support its conclusion by reference to specific terms in
the 1972 Agreement, possibly because there are indeed no such
terms to carry such a load. The only relevant term is the simple
reference in article 6 to "Canadian fishery regulations" which, on its
face and in context, would seem to indicate a referral to all of the
law of Canada pertinent to the "fishery matters" the Agreement was
designed to address. 4s This is an especially compelling interpretation
in light of the protection given French rights by the prescription that
these regulations cannot discriminate against the Saint-Pierre and
Miquelon vessels.49
It is implausible to maintain that the mere mention of Canada's
laws was intended to displace and restrict the authority of Canada
under international law to apply its normal fisheries laws, subject to
nondiscrimination. Yet, the Tribunal concludes that the term "fish-
ery regulations" exhausts Canada's regulatory authority but still re-
fers only to those aspects of regulations that directly set the condi-
tions for taking fish from the ocean. This renders inapplicable other
laws and regulations that relate to fishing but not directly to
harvesting.
Given that the 1972 Agreement concerns only some of Canada's
laws regulating fisheries, the question immediately arises why Can-
ada is unable to apply other Canadian laws which are not dealt with
in the Agreement. The majority opinion does not address this ques-
tion. The Tribunal's unstated assumption appears to be that if Can-
ada wishes to retain its full sovereign rights over fisheries, it must
specifically reserve them in the treaty with France;50 not having
spelled out its sovereign rights, they are lost. According to the Tribu-
nal, the Parties must be treated as if they are on an equal footing in
the advantages of the Agreement rather than as if the Agreement
French interpretation of article 6 to the precise same effect, i.e., that Canada's regulatory
authority derives from article 6. Id. at para. 24.
48. The Preamble to the 1972 Agreement declares:
The Government of Canada and the Government of France, having regard to
the fact the Canadian Government has deemed it necessary, notably with a
view to ensuring the protection of Canadian fisheries, to adopt certain measures
relating to the delimitation of the territorial sea and the fishing zones of Can-
ada, considering it desirable to adapt to present circumstances their mutual
relations in fishery matters,
49. Article 6 of 1972 Agreement. AWARD, supra note 12, at 6.
50. If the majority decision were simply interpreted to mean only that Canada is
inhibited from imposing regulations on fish-catching, then Canada would not be pre-
vented from regulating processing. But the Tribunal decided that, despite its restrictive
interpretation of "fishery regulations," Canada could not, consistently with the Agree-
ment, regulate processing. There appears, therefore, to be an assumption that Canada
also promised not to impose any regulations other than those concerning fish-catching.
AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 53.
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contemplates recognition of the general principle of Canada's exclu-
sive fishery authority subject to exceptions in the Agreement."'
In the end, the decisive factor is that this is a bilateral agreement
between one state seeking to continue its access to a fishery subject
to the sovereign rights of another. There have been hundreds of these
arrangements for access just in recent years.52 On this commonplace
occurrence the majority of the Tribunal hinged its position that Can-
ada's sovereign rights could not be treated as a "statement of princi-
ple and the rights of the other as a statement of an exception. 53
Ironically a great number of bilateral fishery agreements provide
that coastal state laws and regulations apply. It had never before
been suggested that this meant only some of those laws, all others
being excluded. 54
Nothing in the circumstances and records of the negotiations lead-
ing to the 1972 Agreement, as reported in the opinion, suggests that
either party believed the Agreement alone, interpreted restrictively
to exclude normal elements of management authority, was to substi-
tute for Canada's entire authority over fishing matters. 55 The negoti-
ating history not only fails to confirm the Tribunal's restrictive inter-
pretation of the 1972 Agreement, it establishes the opposite." On a
fair examination, the record fully supports the conclusion that both
parties agreed that France was subject to the entire range of Can-
ada's exclusive fishery jurisdiction as well as other Canadian laws
within its general jurisdiction. 5  The minutes of the negotiating
51. The supposed equality discerned by the Tribunal in this arrangement appears
somewhat different in light of the fact that the reciprocal rights to fish apply to areas
that are disproportionate in size and fish productivity, in favor of France.
52. A recent study listed a selection of 286 of the "most important" bilateral
agreements from 1975 through 1982. Carroz and Savini, The Practice of Coastal State
Regarding Foreign Access to Fishery Resources, in FAO, Report of the Expert Consul-
tation on the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of the Exclusive Economic
Zones, FAO FISH. REP. No. 293, at 43, 59-72 (1983).
53. AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 30.
54. Carroz and Savini, supra note 52, at 51-55.
55. The Tribunal discusses and relies upon these records, after specifically ac-
knowledging international case and treaty authority for limiting or excluding the use of
preparatory documents. See especially, Award, supra note 12, at paras. 56-58.
56. See supra note 45. These minutes were produced by Canada in the proceed-
ings. The Tribunal noted that they were not challenged by France and were relied upon
by France during the hearings. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 56.
See especially the meeting of April 8, 1964, para. 11, where Canada noted the juris-
dictional problems arising from implementation of its closing lines which included gen-
eral Canadian legislation, fisheries regulations, and coastal fisheries protection. France
noted the change to internal waters and asked if Canada had worked out the implications
of this change.
57. See especially the meeting of April 8, 1964 para. 11 where Canada noted the
meetings record evidence of this understanding both in 1964 and in
1971. Several times Canada insisted that it possessed sovereignty in
the areas concerned and that nothing inconsistent with that position
was acceptable.58 France did not dispute this, but argued on one oc-
casion that nothing prevented Canada from parting with some of
that sovereignty by accepting restrictions on it.59
Since the Tribunal made reference to and used these minutes of
the negotiations, 0 this evidence of the parties intentions should have
been persuasive and given effect. But even without this evidence of
intentions, there being no contrary evidence of expectations that
Canada had agreed to limitations on its sovereign rights, the general
expectation would be that Canadian laws and regulations were fully
applicable."'
This general expectation is easily confirmed in the terms of the
agreement actually worked out by the parties: Canada agreed to al-
low France access to the Gulfs fisheries on the same basis as Cana-
dian fishermen, in accordance with Canadian nondiscriminatory reg-
ulations applicable to the entire range of fishing operations normally
undertaken in the business.62 In this view, French fishing vessels
would be given a right of access superior to that of any other state
jurisdictional problems arising from implementation of its closing lines. The implementa-
tion included general Canadian legislation, fishery regulations, and coastal fishery protec-
tion. France noted the change to internal waters and asked if Canada had worked out the
implications of this change.
58. Meeting of July 20, 1964, paras. 25, 27, 32.
59. Id. at 32. In this same passage the French negotiator is reported to have said
that France recognized Canada's need to assert its full sovereignty and therefore France
was prepared to accept a particular provision in a Canadian draft concerning enforce-
ment. France also noted that the subjection to Canada's general jurisdiction might lead
to new problems regarding health measures, labor legislation, and customs matters. Id. at
37. These statements are obviously inconsistent with the notion that the reference to
"fishery regulations" exhausted Canada's regulatory competence.
60. The Tribunal specifically wanted to take account of the French assurances
recorded in these minutes concerning any increase in French fishing effort after phasing
out metropolitan French fishing vessels. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 58.
61. The relevant principle is that of restrictive interpretation which has varying
formulations. Whatever one's preferred version, it could be invoked to support this con-
clusion. The only specific indication of the parties' expectations or intentions supports an
interpretation allowing all of Canada's law to be applied to French fishing in Canadian
waters. But if uncertainty remained, it would counsel an interpretation that would pre-
serve Canada's right to regulate. For discussion see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL AND J.
MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD ORDER 171-86 (1967),
and literature cited therein. See also TAMMELO, TREATY INTERPRETATION AND PRACTI-
CAL REASON 14 (1967); HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF
TREATIES 155-56 (1973); J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (9th
ed. 1984). As noted in note 43, supra, the Tribunal in this case used restrictive interpre-
tation in favor of France in adopting a narrow meaning for fisheries regulations. AWARD,
supra note 12, paras. 35, 37.
62. AWARD, supra note 12, 1972 Agreement, arts. 2-6. This was the purpose of
arts. 2-6. The quid pro quo for Canada was the French renunciation of its "privileges
established to its advantage in fishing matters" by the 1904 Convention between the U.S.
and France.
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except Canada, but would nevertheless be subject to the full reach of
Canada's sovereign right to regulate, provided the regulation was
nondiscriminatory. The almost casual reference in article 6 to "Ca-
nadian fishery regulations" is much more consistent with the notion
that Canada retained its general authority subject to the treaty's ex-
ceptions than with the notion that Canada had somehow surrendered
its sovereign rights except as preserved in the agreement and thereby
conferred preferential rights on French trawlers registered in Saint-
Pierre and Miquelon.
As a general approach to the interpretation of bilateral fisheries
agreements, the majority's views about the irrelevance of the basic
principle of coastal state sovereign rights are startling in their impli-
cations. If this approach were generally followed, the coastal state
entering into a bilateral agreement to allow foreign fishing would
lose its sovereign rights unless it specifically preserves them. This
proposition is without authority in international law. Nothing in the
Vienna Convention or article 31 thereof requires such a result or is
even relevant to such a determination."3
Reference to article 31 contributes nothing to the task of identify-
ing a party's legal rights or position prior to entering into a negotia-
tion. There can be no serious doubt that Canada's rights to manage
fisheries within its resource jurisdiction are sovereign rights and that
they exist independent of any bilateral agreement. If the question
were how those rights were lost or negotiated away by the terms of
the treaty, then presumably article 31's provisions on interpretation
could have direct bearing. However the Tribunal did not reach its
result by interpreting the agreement. It simply assumed the answer
to the source of Canada's authority on the basis of the bilateral na-
ture of the agreement. It never explained why this single factor
ought to deprive a State of its inherent power of regulating fishery
activities within its jurisdiction.
The Scope of Coastal State Regulatory Authority
The critical importance of the Tribunal's conclusion about the
source of Canada's regulatory power is obvious in light of the Tribu-
nal's holding with regard to the scope of that power. The Tribunal's
notion that Canada's regulatory power is possessed by virtue of arti-
cle 6 means that the terms of this article alone determine what regu-
63. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (23 May 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969).
lations Canada can impose on French fishing vessels. When, subse-
quently, the Tribunal adopts a narrow and rigid interpretation of
article 6, it confines Canadian regulatory authority only to those sub-ject-matters within that restrictive interpretation. The Tribunal de-
clared it had "no doubt" that in its "natural and ordinary sense,"
judging from municipal laws of the parties and others and from in-
ternational agreements elsewhere, the phrase in article 6 "fishing
regulations" means "legislative or regulatory prescriptions contained
in the various systems of internal law, which fix the conditions to
which all fish-catching activities are subject and are generally
designed to maintain order on fishing grounds as well as to protect
and preserve resources. '"64
Since the Tribunal does not actually discuss its analysis, it is im-
possible to know how it was conceived or conducted. However, the
Tribunal's route to its conclusion rests primarily on its assumptions
about the nature of fishing regulations and on a purported examina-
tion of municipal laws. Those assumptions are unwarranted, and the
examination of municipal law seems incomplete and extremely nar-
rowly formulated. It does not support the conclusion.
It is important to note that fishery regulations in state practice are
concerned with considerably more than protecting a resource, as this
Tribunal appeared to believe. Under general principles of interna-
tional law, coastal state fishery jurisdiction is commonly exercised to
achieve social, political, and economic aims that concern all govern-
ments. This includes, inter alia, employment, incomes, food supplies,
environmental quality, and relations between residents."5 Nations
seek to secure these goals through regulations applying to all activi-
ties involved in or related to the exploitation of fish including fishery
research, searching for fish, habitat protection, exploratory fishing
(determining whether there are commercial quantities available), the
numerous elements of the actual harvest (such as types of gear, how
the gear must be stowed, how and where it may be deployed, what
species can be taken, directly and incidentally, where, when, in what
size and quantity), and how the catch can be processed, transhipped,
transported, landed, discarded, or otherwise disposed of.60 Accord-
64. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 38.
65. For a review and discussion of common objectives of fishery management see
generally, Report of the ACMRR Working Party, supra note 26; Anderson, A Compari-
son of Limited Entry Fishery Management Schemes, Appendix I; FAQ FIsH. REP. No.
289, Supp. 3, supra note 29, includes discussions of management measures and objectives
in Canada, USA, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, EEC, Cuba, Israel, and
Chile. Troadec, supra note 6, at 3-21. In the United States, allocation decisions under
federal law are determined in part by concern for the welfare of land-based processors,
as in other nations. FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT - A GUIDEBOOK TO THE
MAGNUSON FISHERIES CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT AcT, 32-33 (Jacobson, Con-
ner & Tozer, eds. 1985).
66. For a comprehensive summary of coastal state requirements for foreign fish-
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ingly, if "fishery regulations" in article 6 means only the regulation
of fish-catching, it is not because states in practice confine fishery
regulations only to this phase of the fishery business. The restrictive
scope of Canada's regulatory authority over fisheries is solely due to
the Tribunal's conclusion on the source of authority, coupled with its
restrictive interpretation of article 6. The Tribunal's concept of "fish-
ery regulations" bears no resemblance to the real world, whether in
France or in Canada or in general.
In light of the Tribunal's views on the source of coastal state au-
thority in the context of a bilateral fishery agreement, it is important
to refute the idea that any such agreement, referring without further
elaboration to coastal state regulation, is necessarily referring only to
harvesting and not to processing activities. The major ingredient in
the Tribunal's reasoning is simple postulation, without discussion,
that "fisheries regulations" means rules for fishing activities. Thus,
arbitrarily and immediately, the Tribunal limits the range of regula-
tion to only one phase of fisheries.6 7 The Tribunal notes that these
regulations later extended to different elements of the fishing activ-
ity, but this did not change what the Tribunal called the "common
usage" of the term. 8 No evidence is cited for the "common usage";
it is simply assumed to fit the preconception of the majority. The
Tribunal attaches no weight to the preambular statement that the
Agreement concerns the relations of the parties in "fishery matters,"
a subject that might reasonably be considered to embrace activities
beyond harvesting fish.
The Tribunal also invoked the authority of the International Court
to justify use of domestic laws to interpret the Agreement. In seek-
ing to define Canada's regulatory power found in article 6, the Tri-
bunal professed that it must be guided by the content of the internal
law of the parties and by municipal laws generally. Citing the ICJ
judgment of Feb. 5, 1970 in the case concerning the Barcelona Trac-
tion, the Tribunal declared that to appreciate the sense of the phrase
"fishing [sic] regulations""9 the Tribunal must consider that "'It is
ing see Moore, Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing, Appendix C, FAO
LEGIS. STUDY No. 21 (Rev. 2 1985).
67. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 37.
68. Id.
69. Barcelona Traction, 1970 ICJ Rep. 37, para. 50. The Tribunal in several
places in this discussion and elsewhere in the Award refers to "fishing regulations" when
the actual term in article 6 is "fishery regulations." Perhaps this is an inadvertent change
in terminology, but the reference to "fishing" appears more limited than "fishery." The
latter can be regarded as embracing all activities involved in use of a resource, while the
former might be considered to be specific to a particular phase of fishery, namely
to rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems . . . and not
to the municipal law of a particular State' that reference must be
made."70 Without any actual reference to the parties' internal laws
or to rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems, the Tribu-
nal then concluded that "fishing [sic] regulations" referred only to
regulation of fish harvesting and not to fish processing. Therefore
these rules could not extend to the prohibition of filleting aboard
French freezer trawlers."1 The opinion does not indicate a reason for
omitting direct citation or reference to the laws it regarded as signifi-
cant for its interpretation. Omission of any discussion is doubly diffi-
cult to explain because elsewhere in the Tribunal's opinion concern-
ing its interpretation of the LOS Convention, the majority conceded
that "a number of coastal states" had laws governing processing by
foreign vessels within coastal state jurisdiction.7 2 One can only spec-
ulate on the reasons for this discrepancy.
The Tribunal's failure to complete the legal analysis is a severe
flaw and casts substantial doubt on the credibility of the majority
opinion and on its conclusions. Having insisted on the relevance of
municipal laws to assist its interpretative task, one would expect that
the Tribunal would have cited and discussed their significance. The
Tribunal omitted them entirely. Canada's Counter-Memorial called
attention to relevant municipal laws of the two parties. 3 Why those
were not mentioned in the opinion is inexplicable.
In addition to the laws cited by Canada, including French laws on
processing, even a modest search would have discovered that the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC), which makes fishery laws for
France, in 1984 adopted conservation measures for foreign fishing off
the coast of French Guyana. Those measures require that licensed
vessels from two states, while fishing for snapper, must land fifty
percent of their catches in French Guyana. The vessels must land
seventy-five percent if the number of licenses is larger. 4 What this
latter regulation signifies is that the EEC - which is the relevant
harvesting.
70. AWARD, supra note 15, para. 38.
71. Id. at para. 39.
72. Id. at para. 53.
73. Counter Memorial of Canada, April 22, 1986, at 40-43.
74. Moore, supra note 66, at 169. The 1984 regulation was replaced by Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4040/86, 22 December 1986, OJ No. 6 376/101, which continues
to require landings by foreign vessels fishing off French Guiana. Article 7 of the new
regulation deserves special notice. In contrast to the Tribunal's majority view that coastal
state authority to regulate fishing is limited to harvesting and biological considerations,
Article 7 requires a foreign applicant for a license for fishing shrimp within the 200 mile
fishing zone of French Guiana to enter into contracts with Guianan processors that are
"consistent. . . with the objectives for the development of the Guiana economy. . . ." It
can hardly be doubted that EEC authority over fisheries, exercised here expressly for
economic purposes, does not exceed the sovereign rights of Canada over fisheries subject
to its exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at para. 30.
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municipal law besides that of Canada and France in this case
claims that its authority to regulate fisheries in waters subject to its
jurisdiction specifically includes the authority to go beyond regulat-
ing fish-catching. In the case of French Guyana, it comprehends reg-
ulation of processing by requiring the landing of catches taken pur-
suant to licenses it grants. If the Tribunal had actually looked to the
laws of the parties before it and given them the consideration its own
view required, it could not plausibly have come to the conclusion
that the "natural and ordinary meaning" of the critical phrase refers
only to fish catching. At the very least, in view of Canada's provision
of information on the question of municipal law, the Tribunal needed
to explain why these laws were not persuasive; instead, they are
ignored.
The Tribunal's conclusion about the "ordinary and natural"
meaning is even more implausible in light of applying its own injunc-
tion to look at rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems.
If the Tribunal had made a genuine effort in this direction, it would
have discovered that not only the members of the EEC but also nu-
merous states in Asia and Africa regulate processing activities by
provisions that may require foreign fishing vessels to land all or a
part of their catch.75
The majority's view of the "natural and ordinary sense" of "fish-
ery regulations" is further contradicted by its own recognition that
article 62(4)(h) of the LOS Convention permits coastal state regula-
tion of processing.76 Nonetheless, in determining the scope of "fish-
ery regulations," the Tribunal attached no weight to the treaty pro-
vision for coastal states to regulate processing activities in the EEZ.
Indeed, the Tribunal does not even allude to article 62 in discussing
its interpretation of the term, although it does make the later refer-
ence mentioned above.77
It appears obvious that the majority of the Tribunal failed to ap-
75. See the compilation of coastal state requirements in Moore, supra note 66. A
brief search of the literature disclosed at least 31 coastal states with these provisions in
their national laws, not counting the EEC members. Whether 41 or 51 states indicates
"general acceptance" may be arguable. In this specific instance it is relevant that not all
states are likely to be served by regulations about landings by foreigners fishing in the
local EEZ. Accordingly, to find over 40 nations with such legislation or regulation, with-
out searching intensively, is to record a common practice, sufficient at least to indicate
that the term "fishery regulation" cannot justifiably be given a narrow meaning on the
ground that it is the "natural and ordinary" sense of the term.
76. Art. 62(4)(h), LOS Convention, supra note 1. AWARD, supra note 12, para.
53.
77. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 53.
ply the law they identified as a determinative factor in interpretation
of the 1972 Agreement. This performance does nothing to promote
confidence in the process of international adjudication. Subsequent
decision-makers will be misled if they conclude, on reading this opin-
ion, that municipal legal systems seldom regulate processing activi-
ties by foreign vessels within their jurisdiction or that the term "fish-
ery regulation" must be interpreted narrowly to refer only to the
harvesting phase of fishing.
One question that deserves attention is whether it makes any dif-
ference that the Agreement in question was concluded in 1972, while
the decision about its interpretation is made in 1986, after conse-
quential changes in the law of the sea which substantially aug-
mented coastal state authority over fish in a greatly enlarged area of
national jurisdiction. This does not seem to have bothered the Tribu-
nal's majority since the point is not mentioned and nothing in the
opinion suggests a view that Canada's regulatory competence (as op-
posed to specific regulations) differs today from what it was in 1972.
The majority's position is that, even now, Canada's "fishery regula-
tions" refer only to fish-catching. The majority acknowledges that
the 1972 Agreement itself anticipated promulgation of new regula-
tions, but argued that none of the subsequent practice changed the
meaning of the original phrase.
In any event the point requires reiteration that Canada's authority
over foreign fishing does not derive from a bilateral agreement, or
any agreement, with France or any other state or collection of states.
The only real question is whether Canada agreed in 1972 to limit its
regulatory authority as it may evolve over a subsequent period.
The Tribunal also seems to have acquired its limited notion of
fisheries regulation from a mistaken perception that the LOS Con-
vention embodies that same concept. Additionally, the Tribunal as-
serts that previous fisheries agreements were uniformly concerned
only with protecting resources from overexploitation, although since
the late 1950's this perception has been repeatedly dismissed as mis-
directed.7 8 In fact the LOS Convention reflects the modern attitude
that management of fisheries goes well beyond simply protecting a
78. Id. at para. 49. In particular, Hiroshi Kasahara examines this misconception
in his 1971 paper, International Fishery Disputes, in World Fisheries Policy 17 (B.J.
Rothschild, ed. 1972). His conclusion is noteworthy: "The few examples mentioned above
illustrate two things: international disputes over the fishery matters have a rather long
history; and, contrary to the widely accepted notion that most of the past fishery agree-
ments have dealt only with the question of conservation, some of the early agreements
quite squarely faced problems of a political or economical nature. Conservation has in-
deed been a basic theme for most of the international fishery agreements concluded in
recent years. But other features, such as the allocation of resources or catch, or the spe-
cial rights of coastal states, have also been just as important in most cases, whether or
not they are explicitly written in the provisions of the conventions concerned." Id. at 17.
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resource. Since its misconception of the 1982 Convention may have
affected the Tribunal's judgment, an examination of that treaty is
essential to show what it actually provides, as opposed to what this
Tribunal says of it.
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
As mentioned above, disputants are inclined to invoke the 1982
LOS Convention to support their views of disputed jurisdictional
matters.79 Both Canada and France did so in this case. 0 The Tribu-
nal responded by devoting several paragraphs to discussion of various
provisions of the LOS Convention. Although in the end the Tribu-
nal's specific views of the LOS Convention are not dispositive of the
issues and otherwise have little precedential value,81 some of its in-
terpretations may incorrectly influence a subsequent proceeding by
supporting a restrictive concept of fishery conservation.
After referring to the requirement that it rule "in accordance with
international law," the Tribunal observes that the LOS Conference
and state practice during and since "have crystallized a new interna-
tional rule that a coastal state has sovereign rights in its exclusive
economic zone in order to explore and exploit, preserve and manage
natural resources."8 2 The Tribunal found that both parties recognize
this new rule.83
Noting that France has an economic zone and that Canada cre-
ated fishing zones in 1971 and enlarged them in 1977, the Tribunal
"believes that it may legitimately consider that between the Parties"
79. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
80. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 49.
81. The Tribunal held that the 1982 treaty does not displace the 1972 Agree-
ment, but even this is a doubtful conclusion. Award, paragraph 51 first cites article 3t1
of the LOS Convention and then declares: "The Tribunal notes that although the Con-
vention has been signed by Canada and France it has not yet come into force. It would
therefore not be possible to invoke its provisions, notably those detailing the coastal
State's regulatory powers, unless it was clear that these reflected generally accepted
rules, and only in so far as they did in fact express customary rules applicable between
the Parties to the proceedings." AWARD, supra note 12, para. 51.
The doubt arises from the majority's admission that the treaty provisions could have
been invoked when it was "clear that these reflected generally accepted rules" and "ex-
press customary rules applicable between the Parties." Article 62(4)(h) concerning land-
ings of catch by foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ probably now deserves to be consid-
ered as "generally accepted" (see Summary supra note 66). Both Canada and France,
and the EEC for France, have laws regulating landings (in effect, processing), hence it
could be argued strongly that these states accept such coastal authority as part of cus-
tomary law.
82. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 50.
83. Id. at para. 49.
these concepts "are considered equivalent with respect to the rights
exercised therein by a coastal State over the living resources of the
sea."84 However, the Tribunal also noted that it only needed to take
into account those rules that were relevant and applicable to rela-
tions between the parties, meaning those not inconsistent with the
1972 Agreement. 5 The Tribunal ultimately and specifically held
that provisions of the LOS Convention are inconsistent with the
1972 Agreement and that the latter prevails!
The majority's treatment of the Convention is noteworthy for its
determined effort to interpret provisions on coastal authority over
fisheries as narrowly as possible. This approach is consistent with the
majority's attitude toward interpretation of the 1972 Agreement.
The primary aim appears to be to seek support for the view that the
Convention does not authorize the coastal state to regulate process-
ing in the EEZ. However, at times the goal appears as an effort
simply to minimize coastal control over foreign fishing. In the end
the majority recognizes that the LOS Convention does support regu-
lation of processing in the EEZ. However, the majority maintains
that this is inapplicable in face of the 1972 Agreement (as the Tri-
bunal restrictively interprets it).s8
A number of questionable observations are advanced that merit
notice and discussion. In response to a Canadian argument on the
significance of article 56 of the LOS Convention regarding process-
ing in its EEZ, the Tribunal declared that the coastal state's sover-
eign rights for management are always coupled with conservation.
Therefore, it does not appear that this power "has any other purpose
than conservation of resources. 87 Under this interpretation, conser-
vation is regarded as dealing only with protection against overex-
ploitation and not with protection of habitat, allocation of catches, or
promotion of the welfare of those engaged in fishing. In other words,
while the coastal state has management authority, that authority can
only be exercised for "conservation," and not for other management
purposes regarding exploitation of fish.
The Tribunal's characterization of the LOS Convention on this
matter has wider implications than the single issue before it concern-
ing regulation of processing. If the LOS Convention were as de-
scribed, it would severely limit coastal state fishery management as a
means of achieving a variety of significant national social, economic
and political objectives.
The Tribunal does not explain how it reached its conclusion on the
limited nature of management under the LOS treaty, other than not-
84. Id.
85. Id. at para. 51.
86. Id. at para. 53.
87. Id. at para. 50.
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ing the conjunction of the terms "management" and "conserva-
tion."88 There is certainly no a priori reason to consider the func-
tions of management to be limited to conservation defined as
protection of a biological condition. The 1982 Convention is replete
with provisions for coastal state management decisions, in the form
of fishery regulations, that deal with fishery matters broadly.
The most important indication of the breadth of coastal state au-
thority is in designation of the conservation and management mea-
sures that a state is authorized to take and the factors it can take
into account in deciding upon the measures. The most significant
characteristic of this designation is that coastal state conservation
and management measures are not limited to concern for the biolog-
ical condition of the living resources. Indeed this broader concept of
management rights and responsibilities is the most important single
achievement of the Convention in establishing and clarifying coastal
state fish management authority. Article 61(3) declares that conser-
vation and management
measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of har-
vested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield,
as qualified by relevant environment and economic factors, including the
economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements
of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interde-
pendence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum
standards, whether subregional, regional or global.8 9
Considering the critical nature of this provision, it is hardly insig-
nificant that the Tribunal offers a distorted and seriously misleading
version of it by omitting the crucial qualifying phrase occurring im-
mediately after "maximum sustainable yield." 90 The omitted phrase
introduces an entirely different management concept for the outmo-
ded notion of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) by adding eco-
nomic, social, and other factors to the usual biological considera-
tions. Significantly, the latter must be qualified by the former.9" The
Tribunal's legerdemain makes it appear that the Convention simply
continues the traditional concept of management, when the main
purpose of the provision was to place management in the service of
broader social and economic goals.
The meaning of article 61(3) of the Convention is that the level of
88. Id.
89. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 61(3).
90. Compare AWARD, supra note 12, para. 52 and LOS Convention, supra note
1, art. 61(3).
91. See infra notes 96-100, and accompanying text.
fish populations can be managed to meet both environmental and
economic concerns. It need not be limited only to a restrictive notion
of the biological abundance and status of the stocks. This expansion
in management authority was designed to address the major weak-
ness of traditional fishery management schemes that had been identi-
fied by practitioners - that successful fish management must take
account of the effort expended in a fishery as well as the numbers of
fish in order that fish harvesting can more nearly produce maximum
net benefit.92 Unless the coastal state is authorized to undertake such
management, the continuation of foreign fishing as well as national
fishing would considerably damage the resource and reduce the ben-
efits to the coastal state and all fishing interests.
The Tribunal sought a further limit on the meaning of article 61
by narrowly interpreting its language regarding "economic needs of
coastal fishing communities." According to the Tribunal, that phrase
"means the resource needs of such communities and not the whole of
the other economic needs and interests."93 The Tribunal offered no
reason for this conclusion. In fact a correct interpretation reveals
that this reference to the economic needs of coastal fishing communi-
ties in article 61(3) is only the first of several factors in a non-ex-
haustive list of "environmental and economic factors" relevant to the
coastal state for fashioning management and conservation mea-
sures.9 4 Accordingly even if the "economic needs" reference were
narrowed to "resource needs" (as contrasted to employment needs or
income needs having to do with price and quality of fish) - for
which the Tribunal offers no justification - it does not follow that
these are the only "economic needs" that can lawfully be taken into
account in adopting measures. National and local needs of various
kinds relating to income and employment are obviously contem-
plated by the broader reference to relevant economic factors. Finally,
employment in fishery-related activity, such as processing, is a legiti-
mate coastal state economic need.
The drafters of articles 61 and 62 certainly never intended "re-
source needs," in the sense of biological status (abundance) of a re-
source, to exhaust a coastal state's legitimate economic concerns in
managing a resource. The fisheries negotiators in the law of the sea
sessions were well informed about the breadth of coastal fish man-
agement concerns. It is ironic that perhaps the clearest articulation
of these considerations in the negotiations leading to the LOS Con-
92. Crutchfield, Economic and Political Objectives in Fishery Management,
WORLD FISHERIES POLICY, 74 (1972) summarizes these developments as of 1970. See
generally, F. CHRISTY & A. ScoTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES, Chap.
12 (1965).
93. AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 52.
94. See supra note 90.
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vention was in the Canadian working paper on fisheries submitted in
1972.11 That working paper emphasizes the socio-economic factors,
especially employment concerns, underlying the special interest of
the coastal state in adjacent living resources and the basic principles
for coastal state management.96
After completion of the first two LOS negotiating texts, one exper-
ienced and influential negotiator called attention to the new ap-
proach which accommodated social and economic needs and dimin-
ished the importance of the biological factor of maximum catch:
In the past, international fisheries conservation has sought to achieve the
maximum sustainable biological yield from fisheries resources, although this
goal was rarely achieved. Virtually for the first time, a more sophisticated
(and more difficult to define and understand) concept is set as the goal of
fishery conservation.
The new concept incorporated in the RSNT requires the adjustment of the
conservation regulations, seeking the average maximum sustainable yield
(MSY), so as to take into account environmental and economic factors as
well as special requirements of developing countries (social considerations).
In a practical sense, this results in reducing total fishing effort on a particu-
lar stock of fish and maintaining, on the average, a higher level of stock size
with a reduced average annual yield from the fishery.97
It is difficult to put it more plainly. The coastal state measures au-
thorized by this provision could be designed to encompass a good
deal more than mere maximum biological catch that could be sus-
tained over time. This observation also makes clear that these social
goals are achieved in part by maintaining population abundance at a
higher level than is associated with traditional management goals.
This in turn usually means rejection of applications to fish to the
highest level considered safe and this will often translate into reduc-
tion of foreign fishing effort.
LOS negotiators who were diplomats but not fisheries specialists
understood that these new concepts embodied change. Ambassador
Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, chairman of the Second Committee
during the critical 1975 Geneva session of the Conference, reflects
this in an analysis of the EEZ fisheries provisions:
95. Working Paper on Management of the Living Resources of the Sea, in Re-
port of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 21, 164 U.N. DOC. A/8721
(1972).
96. Id.
97. McKernan, Fisheries and the Law of the Sea, 11 MARINE TECH. Soc. J. 20
(1977). From 1966 to his retirement in 1974, Donald L. McKernan was the Special
Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife with the rank of Am-
bassador. He was the principal fisheries negotiator for the United States during this
period.
The maximum sustainable yield and optimum utilization of marine species
have been described as opposing aims. Biggest is not always best. The Ex-
clusive Economic Zone has to be managed in such a way that fish popula-
tions are maintained at or restored to levels that can achieve the maximum
sustainable yield in keeping with relevant economic and environmental fac-
tors (Article 61, paragraph 3). In addition, coastal states must promote the
optimum utilization of the zone's living resources (Article 62, paragraph 1).
While optimum utilization may coincide with the maximum sustainable
yield, it may also mean a smaller yield. Indeed, the maximum yield in
purely quantitative terms does not always lead to larger revenues or more
jobs. Other factors have a bearing on utilization, such as sport and recrea-
tional fishing, tourism, marine parks, and the need to maintain breeding
stocks of fish and other marine animal life. In striving for optimum utiliza-
tion, the economics of fisheries must be considered within the economy as a
whole, and particularly as regards the allocation of material and human
resources to each productive activity. Convergence of the maximum food
yield and the greatest economic utilization of resources must be achieved by
means of complex mechanisms for administering the fishery, referred to in
the text as the management of resources.
Thus the experts define optimum utilization as a deliberate mix of biolog-
ical, economic, social, and political objectives intended to result in the
greatest social benefit as a consequence of the development of fishing
resources.
98
It should be noted that the drafters of these fishery provisions in-
cluded some of the most knowledgeable fish management people in
the world. The terms were carefully chosen to allow coastal states to
undertake management to satisfy the full range of needs attainable
by the fishery in question. Ambassador Galindo Pohl's excellent
analysis recognizes that the new management objectives were well
understood by negotiators.
Article 61's terms for flexible and broad management are rein-
forced by the comprehensive scope of the regulatory power embraced
in article 62. It is impossible to read the detailed regulatory mea-
sures in article 62 and conclude that management is restricted only
to biological concerns of fish conservation or to "resource needs" in
the limited sense implied by the Tribunal. Professor Pharand's dis-
senting opinion identifies specific measures from article 62 that es-
tablish coastal state authority over processing in the EEZ:
In my opinion, the specific legal bases for regulating processing, including
filleting, are found, either separately or in combination, in the following
enumerated matters of Article 62: licensing of fishing vessels and equipment
(subparagraph a); regulating the type of fishing vessels (sub-paragraph b);
and, specifying the information required of fishing vessels (sub-paragraph
e). In addition, the coastal State may rely on the "other terms and condi-
tions" clause in the introductory part of paragraph 4 of that Article."
The regulatory authority in article 62 is intentionally stated in
broad terms to be consistent with the designation "sovereign right of
98. Galindo Pohl, The Exclusive Economic Zone in the Light of Negotiations at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in THE ExCLUSIVE Eco-
NOMIC ZONE 31, 53 (Vicuna, ed. 1984).
99. AWARD, supra note 12, dissenting opinion, para. 17.
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managing," as expressed in article 56.100 It is also consistent with the
concept of sovereign rights that article 62 does not specifically enu-
merate all of the powers the coastal state may exercise through its
laws and regulations and "other terms and conditions." Foreign fish-
ing states must comply with conservation measures "and with the
other terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of
the coastal state."''1 1 It is plain that the coastal state regulatory au-
thority is restrained only to the extent that it must act consistently
with the Convention. There are no subject-matter limitations that
exclude such measures as regulation of processing, regulation of fish-
ery research, powers to tax, or requirements relating to marketing,
or requirements about the disposition of the catch. The coastal state
is clearly not prohibited from regulating any phase of the" fishing in-
dustry that occurs within its EEZ. If such regulation were impermis-
sible, the coastal state would not have "sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing" as provided
in article 56, nor the discretion to select applicable "terms and
conditions."
The sum of articles 56, 61, and 62 is that the coastal state deter-
mines the possibility of participation by a foreign entity in any phase
of the fishing industry within the EEZ. If such participation is per-
mitted, the coastal state decides the terms and conditions. Bilateral
negotiations are the means for shaping the precise conditions of ac-
cess if change is desirable and possible.
Under these specific categories of regulation, the coastal state may
indirectly achieve important management goals related to specific
national social and economic needs. Thus specific objectives in one
dimension of a fishery can be achieved through regulations directed
at another matter. For example, the objective of regulating who may
fish may be easily accomplished via the power to establish and ad-
minister fee arrangements. If a coastal state bargains with distant
water states, it can determine access to its surplus fish simply by
accepting the highest payments offered, thus excluding all other bid-
ders. 02 Establishing requirements for the area, duration and timing
100. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 56.
101. Id. at art. 62(4).
102. It is this provision on fees that makes it economically feasible for a coastal
state to allow foreign fishing on a "surplus." Since the consequences of allowing the
increased fishing effort represented by foreign fishing are very likely to reduce the net
income available to local fishing by increasing their costs, foreign fishing on a "surplus"
imposes a loss on those fishermen. Article 62(4)(a) allows the coastal state to charge fees
at a level that will balance this additional cost, in addition to the other benefits it might
of permissible fishing may also affect who is allowed to fish, if at all,
what they may catch and what may be earned. Thus, setting of
times for fishing may preclude some participants from fishing at all
and, by the same token, may determine the size and quality of the
harvest, thus affecting prices.
Similarly, through its capacity to regulate the "types, sizes and
numbers of fishing vessels that may be used," the coastal state may
determine what range of activities may be pursued by foreign fisher-
men. Establishing the permissible size of vessel may exclude any or
some foreign harvesting or, while allowing harvesting, may exclude
processing. Control over numbers of vessels determines the level of
income for participants from the given level of abundance and total
catch. In addition, the authority to determine what species may be
caught, and to fix quotas of catch by stock or by vessel, is the au-
thority to determine when fishing is permissible and whether it may
include processing. One of the outcomes of this case may be that by
control over quotas, which the Tribunal considers within the inde-
pendent authority of Canada, there can be no effective use of factory
trawlers in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 10 3
The majority opinion had difficulty with the provision on laws and
regulations in the LOS Convention. It is not an easy task to squeeze
this broad terminology into the narrow scope of the Tribunal's con-
cept of coastal authority. The majority's concern was whether the
sovereign rights to manage the fishery included regulation of process-
ing, specifically of filleting aboard the fishing vessel. In a textbook
example of how not to interpret a treaty, the majority primarily fo-
cussed on but one subparagraph of the treaty before concluding that
"[iln the Tribunal's view, the regulation of filleting at sea cannot a
priori be justified by coastal State powers under the new law of the
sea rules."'1 4
In reaching this conclusion the majority acknowledged that the list
of fields of regulation was not exhaustive, but stated that "it does not
appear that the regulatory authority of the coastal state normally
derive by allowing foreign access. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 62(4)(a).
103. But this result does not necessarily follow. In actions subsequent to the
Award, Canada unilaterally established fishing quotas for French vessels fishing in Cana-
dian waters. France protested both the unilateral character of the decision and the size of
the quota. In negotiations from Oct. 1986 to January 1987, the two parties agreed to
further negotiations which would inter alia establish annual fishing quotas for French
vessels in Canadian waters for the period 1988-91 inclusive. This was to be agreed by
September 1987 but its effectiveness depended on another agreement to resolve other
maritime claims off the coasts of Saint-Pierre, Miquelon and Canada. Unofficial English
translation of Agreed Record of Canada-France Negotiations from October 1986 to Jan-
uary 1987. If disagreements about the authority to set quotas and their size are not
resolved by the Parties, France can refer them to the dispute settlement procedures of the
1972 Agreement. In the end, therefore, Canada does not have the final say about quotas.
104. AWARD, supra note 12, at para. 52.
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includes the authority to regulate subjects of a different nature than
those described.' 0 5 Not finding any specific reference to "process-
ing" the majority found that the references to "gear" in article
62(4)(c) were only to fishing equipment in article 4(a) of the agree-
ment.10 6 The reference in article 4(a) of the Agreement could not
include filleting equipment since this was processing equipment
which "cannot be assimilated to fishing equipment in the ordinary
meaning of terms."107
The problem with this approach is that it does not seek to take
into account the whole of the provision being interpreted before stat-
ing a conclusion about the meaning of a part thereof. When the ma-
jority was forced to consider the whole of article 62(4) it had to
conclude that indeed the coastal state did have authority to prohibit
processing because subparagraph 4(h) specifically refers to "the
landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of
the coastal State,"'' 08 a regulation whose purpose often naturally pre-
cludes processing on board the fishing vessel. The majority noted
that a number of states do require landings in order to encourage
local processing or to protect jobs on land.109 Despite the clarity of
the provision, the majority nonetheless concluded that this provision
could be made "applicable to foreign vessels only if the coastal State,
acting within its sovereign rights, is not bound by any treaty or if a
provision to this effect is included in a specific treaty concluded by
the coastal State."" 0 As discussed, this statement is without justifi-
cation if it means that in a bilateral agreement dealing with fisheries
the coastal state must expressly reserve all of its authority over fish-
ing activities or be limited only to that authority mentioned in the
bilateral agreement. No legal basis for this view is cited and so far
as known, none exists."'
Despite the finding that a part of article 62(4) definitely contem-
plated the exercise of coastal regulatory power over processing, and




108. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 62(4)(h).
109. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 53.
110. Id. at para 53.
11I. In any event, a bilateral agreement on fisheries matters which refers to "fish-
ery regulations" without qualification does not by use of such a term exclude require-
ments concerning landing or processing. Such a phrase is broad enough under normal
circumstances to meet a supposed requirement for a treaty provision on the matter. Of
course this Tribunal decided otherwise.
of the Tribunal still interpreted other parts of the article narrowly to
exclude reference to processing equipment. No explanation for this is
given except for a reference to the "ordinary meaning of terms." '
As noted, the effect is to confer on France the right to use a type of
vessel that, through other regulations (quotas), Canada has the right
to render useless. 1 3 It is interesting to note that subsequent to this
Award, France is claiming that Canada does not have independent
authority to fix quotas.1 14 If this view is upheld in arbitration, Can-
ada may lose virtually all meaningful control over this French
fishery.
Whatever the Tribunal's views on the application of the LOS Con-
vention in the context of this specific dispute, it is clear that this
extremely limited concept of coastal authority for fishery manage-
ment departs from the reality of international practice and is without
legal substance.
Full Sovereignty and Functional Sovereignty
The majority opinion devotes a few sentences to a supposed dis-
tinction between "full sovereignty" and "functional jurisdiction." 116
This distinction, though difficult to interpret, could have disturbing
implications in general application. The remarks on this point arose
out of the parties' disagreement about the interpretation of the refer-
ence to "equal footing" in article 4 and "without discrimination" in
article 6. France contended that the provision that French trawlers
may continue to fish on an equal footing with Canadian trawlers
meant that French trawlers have a right of access in common with
Canadian vessels.11 " Canada contended that "equal footing" and
"without discrimination" meant the same thing, namely that French
112. Apparently the meaning of terms in the actual context of their use, as shown
by other parts of the some paragraph, is not sufficient to alter their "ordinary meaning"
which the Tribunal selected without regard to context.
113. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 63.
114. The only specific reference to quotas in the 1972 Agreement is in article 2
which reads:
In return, the Canadian Government undertakes in the event of a modification
to thejuridical regime relating to the waters situated beyond the present limits
of the territorial sea and fishing zones of Canada on the Atlantic coast, to
recognize the right of French nationals to fish in these waters subject to possi-
ble measures for the conservation of resources, including the establishment of
quotas. The French Government undertakes for its part to grant reciprocity to
Canadian nations off the coast of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon.
It seems unlikely that article 6 should be interpreted to exclude Canada's exclusive right
to establish quotas within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, when the Agreement clearly envi-
sions a right for areas outside this fishing zone. Subsequent practice is alleged by the
French to indicate the right is not exclusive, but consultation with the French prior to
establishing the quota does not suffice to deprive Canada of the right the parties intended
in the Agreement. The records of the negotiations are very clear on this intention.
115. AWARD, supra note 12, para. 48.
116. Id. at para. 32.
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trawlers were entitled to national treatment, i.e., they were subject to
the same regulatory regime as Canadian vessels. 117 The Tribunal
said that in practice, French vessels were not given national treat-
ment and that they were subject to different laws, regulations, and
particularly to different quotas than those applicable to Canadian
vessels.1 18 The Tribunal decided that "equal footing" meant a right
of access to exploit the resource on the same basis as the Canadian
vessels."19
Strangely, the Tribunal did not devote similar discussion to the
principle of nondiscrimination in article 6 other than repeat what it
had said in relation to "equal footing."' 20 The Tribunal declared that
this principle is limited in scope because in the past different regula-
tions have been applied to French vessels than to French fishing
boats. The Tribunal then offered a troubling comment:
Obviously, when in the exercise of the full sovereignty to which it is entitled
over its own nationals Canada forbids them to engage in any given activity
this does not entitle it to apply a similar prohibition in its fishing zone to
French nationals enjoying fishing rights there that are recognized by treaty,
for it cannot invoke its full sovereignty in a zone where the jurisdiction it
exercises is only functional. Furthermore, as regards the scope of this prin-
ciple, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the principle of non-discrimination
relates only to the application of fishing regulations (these as previously de-
fined) and that therefore it could not apply to processing catches at sea.121
The references to "sovereignty" here are not clear since if the last
sentence means that Canada has no authority to regulate processing,
then the principle of non-discrimination is irrelevant. On the other
hand, the gratuitous nature of the statement calls for some comment
if it is intended to have significance for the immediate problem. The
1972 Agreement certainly authorized Canada to regulate French
trawlers and would appear to authorize no different treatment than
accorded Canadian vessels if the principle of nondiscrimination
means anything. The Tribunal appears to imply that in an exclusive
fishing zone, where sovereignty is "functional," the coastal state can-
not impose prohibitions decreed for its nationals upon foreigners be-
cause its limited jurisdiction in the latter instance is insufficient. The
specific statement of the Tribunal refers not to foreigners generally
but to "French nationals enjoying fishing rights there that are recog-
117. Id.
118. Id. at para. 34.
119. Id.
120. Id. at para 48.
121. Id.
nized by treaty. '122 However, this is not relevant where the question
is what those rights are in relation to Canada's authority to impose
nondiscriminatory regulations. In other words, this reference begs
the question and has nothing to do with the degree of Canadian
"sovereignty" in the fishing zone. In any case this reference to fish-
ing pursuant to a treaty is not offered as the reason for the difference
in treatment. The difference is between "full" and "functional" sov-
ereignty, a difference which does not arise from the bilateral
agreement.
The Tribunal's statement cannot be taken to mean that foreigners
fishing in the exclusive economic zone pursuant to the LOS Conven-
tion escape the same or different regulations from those imposed on
the coastal state's nationals. The EEZ under the LOS Convention
establishes functional sovereignty. This hardly insulates the foreigner
from coastal fishing regulation prohibiting a particular activity to all
those fishing there, national or foreign. Furthermore, the LOS Con-
vention does not provide that foreign fishing must be treated exactly
as domestic. Indeed the Convention does not hold out assurance that
foreign fishing will be permitted at all except under conditions uni-
laterally determined by the coastal state. When foreign fishing is al-
lowed, it must comply with coastal regulation subject only to the
requirement of reasonableness, i.e., that the regulation be rationally
related to a permissible objective.123 It is not unreasonable to pro-
hibit foreigners from undertaking activities also forbidden to nation-
als. Nor is it necessarily unreasonable to exclude foreigners from ac-
tivities permitted to nationals. The Tribunal's conception of this
standard also merits comment.
The Standard of Reasonableness
According to article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement of 1985, the
Tribunal was to rule in accordance with international law.' 2' Pursu-
ant to that injunction, the Tribunal invokes passages from prior in-
ternational decisions and seeks to use them for guidance in its con-
sideration of issues. Unfortunately, recourse to previous opinions in
cases not on point for more or less abstract propositions of law does
not lead to, or create, sound application to immediate circumstances.
Earlier comment noted the misapplication of the interpretive ap-
proach the Tribunal extracted from the Barcelona Traction case. 125
Strangely enough, another instance arises from that same case. After
122. Id.
123. The Tribunal invoked the rule of reason in the form that "requires state be-
havior to be proportional to the aim legally pursued, with due regard to the rights and
freedoms granted to another state." AWARD, supra note 12, para. 54.
124. Id., p. 2.
125. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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conceding that under the LOS Convention the coastal state can reg-
ulate processing were it not for another agreement such as the 1972
Agreement, the majority again invoked the Barcelona case:
The Tribunal finally points out that, like the exercise of any authority, the
exercise of a regulatory authority is always subject to the rule of reasona-
bleness invoked by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Trac-
tion case, as follows: "The Court considers that, in the field of diplomatic
protection as in all other fields of international law, it is necessary that the
law be applied reasonably . . . ." That rule requires State behavior to be
proportional to the aim legally pursued, with due regard to the rights and
freedoms granted to another State.128
This quotation is immediately followed by another from the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case in 1910. This latter quotation, how-
ever, differs because it refers directly to a requirement of reasonable-
ness in regulating fisheries: "The Award considered that the only
regulations to appear reasonable were those which were 'appropriate
or necessary for the protection and preservation of such fisheries, or
desirable or necessary on grounds of public order and morals without
unnecessarily interfering with the fishery itself.' ...
As if these quotations from other cases involving other circum-
stances were sufficient to make the conclusion self-evident, the Tri-
bunal then declares:
In the present case, the Tribunal therefore holds that Canada can only use
its regulatory authority concerning the French trawlers referred to in Arti-
cle 4(b) of the 1972 Agreement in a reasonable manner, i.e., without sub-jecting the exercise of the right to fish enjoyed by such trawlers under the
Agreement to requirements which in effect make that exercise
impossible. 128
Two points about this conclusion of the Tribunal are central. First,
the entire preceding analysis in the opinion was devoted to the argu-
ment that Canada had no right to regulate as it sought to do regard-
ing La Bretagne. In fact, the Tribunal argued that Canada had
never really adopted what the Tribunal considered "fishery regula-
tions" within the meaning of the 1972 Agreement.2 9 In light of
these positions, it is curious that the standard of reasonableness was
thought to have any relevance at all. To invoke the principle that a
regulation must be reasonable presumes that the authority to regu-
late exists in the first place. Therefore this part of the opinion is
irrelevant unless the discussion of reasonableness relates to future
126. Award, supra note 12, para. 54.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at para. 47.
relations of the Parties. The Tribunal repeatedly advises that its
overriding concern is the future relations of the Parties. Therefore,
this pronouncement, even if dictum, has portents for the future.
Secondly, assuming reasonableness is appropriately invoked, the
application of the standard to the facts in the case seems extrava-
gantly incorrect. It is difficult to discern, let alone understand, the
reasoning underlying this application. The Tribunal simply presumes
that a prohibition on filleting makes it impossible for France to exer-
cise the right to fish. In light of the preceding 200 years of continu-
ous French fishing in the area, little of it employing freezer trawlers
(none of it from Saint-Pierre and Miquelon), the connection between
the prohibition and the right to fish simply does not exist. It is not
reasonable to assume that future fishing from Saint-Pierre and Mi-
quelon would be impossible unless freezer trawlers are employed.
On the other hand, perhaps these propositions by the Tribunal had
another significance. The Tribunal may be anticipating future diffi-
culty from Canadian regulations affecting the use of foreign trawl-
ers. If Canada subsequently exercises its right to regulate by inde-
pendently imposing quotas for French freezer trawlers, it could be
argued on the basis of this opinion that a particular quota is so low
as to be unreasonable because its practical effect is to prohibit
freezer trawlers. This is pure speculation. Nothing in the opinion di-
rectly suggests this possibility. Indeed some of the majority's views
might be interpreted to suggest the opposite. Nonetheless, subse-
quent to this opinion, France has expressed its regret that the quotas
established by Canada for 1987 are "so low." In addition, France
declared that "they consider that such quotas will not permit French
vessels to benefit effectively from the permanent fishing rights" of
France under the 1972 Agreement.3 0
The Dispute Settlement Provision of the 1972 Agreement
Article 10 of the 1972 Agreement establishes a compulsory dis-
pute resolution procedure between the parties. Paragraph 3 provides
"If, in connection with any dispute referred to the Commission by
either of the contracting parties, the Commission has not within one
month reached a decision acceptable to the contracting parties, ref-
erence shall be made to the third expert. The Commission shall then
sit as an arbitral tribunal under the chairmanship of the third ex-
pert."'13' This procedure effectively binds each of the parties to pro-
ceed at the initiative of the other. In addition it precludes refusal or
130. French protest note to Canada, January 1987, referring to the Canadian Em-
bassy's Notes Verbales No. 353 of Dec. 30, 1986 and No. 026 of Jan. 27, 1987.
131. 1972 Agreement, AWARD, supra note 12, at 7.
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failure to cooperate.3 2
This settlement procedure, especially in light of the majority's use
of the reasonableness standard, may seriously compromise Canada's
general fisheries management authority insofar as it might affect
French vessels. It may also affect Canadian vessels if domestic inter-
ests now push for equal treatment. If, for example, Canadian fishery
regulations such as specific quotas, may be so easily challenged as
this provision suggests, both the finality and significance of manage-
ment measures are called into serious question. It may be recalled in
this connection that the possibility of undermining coastal state regu-
lation was the primary factor for limiting application of compulsory
dispute procedures to issues arising under the fisheries provisions
under the LOS Convention. Article 297 of the Convention excepts
from compulsory settlement procedures "any dispute relating to [the
coastal state's] sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in
the exclusive economic zone or their exercise .... 1,133 This decision
in this case substantiates the wisdom of that exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in the La Bretagne award leaves an enor-
mous amount to be desired. The decision is inexplicable except as it
reflects serious misunderstanding of international fisheries law and a
general predisposition among some international lawyers to regard
coastal state fishery management in areas of extended jurisdiction
with suspicion and mistrust. As faulty as this opinion and its out-
come are, its impact upon future Canadian fisheries management in
the Gulf of St. Lawrence remains unclear.
Most of the uncertainty stems from what the Tribunal identified
as certain "final considerations" which appear to make the use of
freezer trawlers impractical. The Tribunal acknowledged that the
additional fishing capacity of these trawlers might pose a threat to
the fishery resources of the Gulf. 3 4 Noting that the parties had set a
double limit on fishing effort from Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (ten
trawlers of fifty meters each), the Tribunal said that it "does not
rule out the possibility that, in so doing, they also contemplated giv-
ing these vessels a total fishing capacity comparable to that possessed
by 10 wetfish trawlers of the same size."'135
132. Id.
133. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 297.
134. AWARD, supra note 12, paras. 62-63.
135. Id. para. 63.
The Tribunal did not accept the fact that the use of freezer trawl-
ers would necessarily lead to catches over and above those allocated
to ten wetfish trawlers. Therefore, the prohibition on filleting was not
warranted. Additional reasons for this conclusion were that (1)
overfishing by French trawlers would be a breach of good faith, for
which France would be liable; (2) during the proceedings, France
made a commitment that the French vessels would not exceed their
authorized quota; and (3) Canada supervises the actual fishing and
can assure itself that no excessive catch is taken by freezer
trawlers.' 3 6
These reassuring words indicate that though a freezer trawler can-
not be prohibited from fishing, it cannot actually take fish in accor-
dance with its enlarged fishing capacity. If this is the correct inter-
pretation, one wonders why the Tribunal went through such
contortions to reach its result. In the final analysis, it appears that
Canada can determine the most significant outcome of fishing in the
Gulf - how much fish can be taken by any one vessel or group of
vessels - but cannot prohibit or regulate the type of vessel by which
that catch can be taken. This conclusion is reached despite the ad-
mission that the type of vessel involved may have a harmful impact
on a resource. The utility of this result is not self-evident from either
party's perspective.
Another interpretation of these "considerations" is possible. The
Tribunal does not directly address the question of who determines
the quotas to be taken in the Gulf. The impression is that this is
Canada's decision. If it is Canada's exclusive prerogative to fix the
catch, there may be no problem. If, however, the determination of a
quota must be reasonable in its impact on the fishing process, and on
the right to fish, then the premise is established for an argument that
if Canada sets the same quota for freezer trawlers as it did for
wetfish trawlers, the effect is to prevent these vessels from exercising
their right to fish. Furthermore, an argument might be made that
Canada's quota is a means of discriminating against French vessels,
which are the only freezer trawlers permitted in the Gulf. Under
article 10 of the 1972 Agreement, it appears that France could force
another arbitral decision on these issues.
What appear to be possibilities only in the terms of the Award
may be much closer to realities in light of events subsequent to the
Award. According to an unofficial English version of a protest note
to Canada,
French authorities strongly protest the unilateral establishment by Cana-
dian authorities of the fishing quotas allocated to France in Canadian wa-
ters in 1987. They consider such action to be contrary to both the letter and
136. Id.
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the spirit of the [1972] Treaty . . . and to the practice followed by the
Parties in application of this Treaty: the fishing quotas allocated annually to
France by Canadian authorities have, in fact, always been established by
the two countries by agreement .... 137
France also objected that the quotas were so low.138
The fate of these protests is not known at this writing nor is it
known how Canadian-French fishing relations in general are pro-
gressing, except that there are continuing difficulties concerning
French fishing off eastern Canada.
The major conclusion in assessing this Award and the majority
opinion of the Tribunal is that the Award is not reliable authority
for the process of treaty interpretation, the substantive positions it
holds regarding the specific issues in dispute, or the general implica-
tions of the propositions offered in support of its conclusions. The
opinion is flawed not only in its general approach to coastal state
fishery management authority, but also as a dependable source of
guidance for smooth fishery relations between Canada and France.
137. Agreed Record, supra note 103. I am grateful to Dean Donald MacRae of
the University of Ottawa for assistance in securing the Award and the Canadian memo-
rials and to Prof. Ted McDorman of the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, for
sending me the Agreed Record, the French and Canadian notes, and other materials on
this episode.
138. Id.

